Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling

Olivier Bos and Tom Truyts
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Tom Truyts: Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium

No 2016017, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. The expected revenue maximizing entry fee is the maximal fee that guarantees full participation.

Keywords: Monotonic signaling; social status; first-price auction, entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05-23
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Related works:
Journal Article: Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (2023)
Working Paper: Entry in First-Price Auctions with Signaling (2022)
Working Paper: Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (2022)
Working Paper: Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (2022)
Working Paper: Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2016017

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