The judge and the market: legal rule, coordination and hermeneutics in Hayekian spontaneous order

Samuel Ferey ()

Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political Economy, 2008, issue 54, 57-83

Abstract: The article focuses on a tension in the Hayekian representation of legal rules. While rules perform an essential function of coordination by providing common interpretation about the legitimate expectations, Hayek does not really develop the mechanisms by which common interpretations may emerge. Firstly, the functions of coordination of rules are presented. We show then that rules are constituted by individual meanings. Finally we show none of the two mechanisms producing shared interpretations, the sense of justice and the judge, is able to guarantee the resolution of conflicts of interpretation between individuals. Such a conflict questions therefore spontaneous order's efficiency and justice.

JEL-codes: B20 K0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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