q-fixed majority efficiency of committee scoring rules

Clinton Gubong Gassi () and Eric Kamwa ()
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Clinton Gubong Gassi: Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE, UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France
Eric Kamwa: Université de Lorraine, BETA, F-54000 Nancy, France

No 2024-17, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: This paper introduces the q-fixed majority property for committee selection rules, which extends the traditional fixed majority principle to a flexible framework. We examine conditions under which the committee scoring rules satisfy the q-fixed majority property. Focusing on (weakly) separable rules, we find that the Bloc rule is the only which satisfies it for all q > 1/2. In addition, the q-bottom majority property is introduced, highlighting conditions under which committees can be excluded based on voter consensus.

Keywords: Voting; multiwinner elections; committee scoring rules; q-fixed majority. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-des
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