Multi-winner rules analogous to the Plurality rule

Clinton Gubong Gassi () and Frank Steffen ()
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Clinton Gubong Gassi: Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE, UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France
Frank Steffen: Faculty of Law, Business and Economics, University of Bayreuth, Germany

No 2024-18, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to identify the multi-winner voting rules that can be con- sidered as extension of the Plurality rule. Multi-winner voting addresses the problem of selecting a fixed-size subset of candidates, called a committee, from a larger set of available candidates based on the voters’ preferences. In the single-winner setting, where each voter provides a strict ranking of the candidates and the goal is to select a unique candidate, Yeh (2008) characterized the Plurality rule as the only voting rule satisfying five independent axioms: anonymity, neutrality, consistency, efficiency, and top-only. In this paper, we demonstrate that a natural extension of these axioms to the multi-winner framework allows us to identify a class of top-k counting rules as multi-winner analogous to the Plurality rule.

Keywords: Multi-winner; voting rules; axioms; Plurality rule; top-k counting rules. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mac and nep-pol
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