Cooperative games with unpaid players

Sylvain Béal (), Léa Munich (), Philippe Solal () and Kevin Techer ()
Additional contact information
Sylvain Béal: Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France
Léa Munich: Université Paris Panthéon Assas, CRED UR 7321, F-75005 Paris, France
Philippe Solal: Université de Saint-Etienne, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, UMR 5824, F-42023 Saint-Etienne, France
Kevin Techer: Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France

No 2025-11, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: We consider cooperative TU-games with unpaid players, which are described by a TUgame and two categories of players, paid and unpaid. Unpaid players participate in the cooperative game but are not rewarded for their participation, for instance for legal reasons. The objective is then to determine how the contributions of unpaid players are redistributed among the paid players. To meet this goal, we introduce and characterize axiomatically three values that are inspired by the Shapley value but differ in the way they redistribute the contributions of unpaid players. These values are unified as instances of a more general two-step allocation procedure.

Keywords: Unpaid players; Shapley value; Harsanyi dividends; axioms; two-step procedure; Priority value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2025-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-spo
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/WP-2025-11.pdf First version, 2025 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crb:wpaper:2025-11

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from CRESE Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laurent Kondratuk ().