Allocation rules for network games with local considerations

Sylvain Béal (), Emmanuelle Lebeuf () and Kevin Techer ()
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Sylvain Béal: Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France
Emmanuelle Lebeuf: Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, F-25000 Besançon, France
Kevin Techer: Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France

No 2026-08, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: We introduce a new allocation rule for network games that combines a local component and a global component. The local component depends only on the links incident to each player, whereas the global component allocates a surplus equally among the members of each connected component. We characterize this allocation rule by three classical axioms together with a new axiom, Fairness under Neighborhood Restriction, which requires that two adjacent players experience the same payoff variation when the network is restricted to their local neighborhoods, that is, to the sets of links incident to each player. We also examine an alternative allocation rule that differs only in its global component, distributing the surplus within each connected component in proportion to players’ degrees in the network.

Keywords: Network games; Fairness under Neighborhood Restriction; Neighborhood Equal Surplus Division; axiomatic characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2026-09
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