Mandated versus Negotiated Severance Pay

Stéphane Auray, Samuel Danthine and Markus Poschke

No 2014-28, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Abstract: the former worse (given their observed strength). These predictions are confronted with

Keywords: Severance pay; Unions; Bargaining; Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J32 J33 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2014-08
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Working Paper: Mandated versus Negotiated Severance Pay (2014)
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