Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing

Klenio Barbosa and Pierre Boyer

No 2016-37, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Abstract: We study the long-run impact of procurement discrimination on market structure and future competition in industries where learning-by-doing makes incumbent firms more efficient over time. We consider a sequential procurement design problem in which local and global firms compete for public good provision. Both firms benefit from learningby-doing if they provide the public good in the previous period, but global firms only may be able to transfer learning-by-doing from different markets. We show when the optimal procurement has to be biased in favor of the local firm even when all firms are symmetric with respect to their initial cost distribution.

Keywords: Discrimination; Dynamic Procurement; Local versus Global Firms; Learningby-doing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50
Date: 2016-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing (2021)
Working Paper: Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing (2012)
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