A Strategic Tax Mechanism

Giorgos Stamatopoulos ()
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Giorgos Stamatopoulos: Department of Economics, University of Crete, Greece

No 2302, Working Papers from University of Crete, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze a novel tax mechanism in imperfectly competitive markets. The government announces an excise tax rate and auctions-off a number of tax exemptions. Namely, it invites the firms in a market to acquire the right to be exempted from the excise tax. The highest bidders are exempted by paying their bids; and all other firms remain subject to it.

Keywords: commodity tax; tax exemption; auction; entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H25 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2023-02-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-des and nep-pbe
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