Discriminating to learn to discriminate

Esther Hauk

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite prisoner's dilemma supergames reveal that many hypotheses used in the literature to explain cooperation are wrong. In particular the existence of player types is rejected as well as over-simplified behavioural postulates which allow for the existence of agents who make consistent errors. Experimental subjects turn out to permanently search for a better strategy. It is further suggested that the freedom to choose whether or not to play the prisoner's dilemma might be a key element in explaining observed cooperation levels in real data

Keywords: Prisoner's; dilemma; Cooperation; Exit; Experiments; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams ... d96dc219fb29/content (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:6058

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().