Interim efficient mechanisms for a public decision making in a discrete framework

Mikel Pérez-Nievas

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: In this paper. I characterize the set of Bayesian incentive compatible anonymous mechanisms in a discrete public good problem when preferences are private information. With this result in hand, I characterize the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms as voting schemes in which votes are weighted according to the tax paid by each agent.

Keywords: Public; goods; Voting; mechanisms; Interim; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:7221

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