Efficiency Wages, Unio-Firm Bargaining, and Strikes

Ana Mauleon and Vincent J. Vannetlebosch
Additional contact information
Vincent J. Vannetlebosch: UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) ; Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS)

No 2001010, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that efficiency wage effects do not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium. However, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm and the productivity enhancing effects of paying higher wages are sufficiently large, then efficiency wage effects still increase the wage of equilibrium. More surprisingly, we show that efficiency wage effects increase the strike activity.

Keywords: Wages; Bargaining; Strikes; Efficiency wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 J50 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6
Date: 2001-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2001-10.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:2001010

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Virginie LEBLANC ().