Strategic Union Delegation and Strike Activity

Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 2002011, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which te union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus-maximizing delegates or to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We show that the strike activity is greater whenever the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates instead of surplus-maximizing delegates. We also provide the necessary and sufficient condition such that it is always optimal for the union to choose wage-maximizing delegates and we we find that the efficiency loss due to strategic delegation may be quite important.

Keywords: Union delegation; Wage bargaining; Private information; Strike activity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 J50 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13
Date: 2002-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic union delegation and strike activity (2005)
Journal Article: Strategic union delegation and strike activity (2005)
Working Paper: Strategic union delegation and strike activity (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:2002011

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