EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Budgetary Referenda: An Efficient Alternative to Representative Democracy

Roger A. Arnold, Thomas L. Wyrick and Thomas L. Wyrick
Additional contact information
Thomas L. Wyrick: University of Nevada-Las Vegas
Thomas L. Wyrick: Southwest Missouri State University

Cato Journal, 1982, vol. 2, issue 2, 637-652

Abstract: In any complex environment, it is often difficult to determine whether policy failures are caused by incompetent decision makers or by the institutional setting in which those individuals must oper- ate. The issue is an important one, for it is doubtful that failed orga- nizations will recover unless the appropriate changes are made, be they in personnel, or institutions, or both...

Date: 1982
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/f ... 1982/12/cj2n2-14.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cto:journl:v:2:y:1982:i:2:p:637-652

Access Statistics for this article

Cato Journal is currently edited by James A. Dorn

More articles in Cato Journal from Cato Journal, Cato Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Emily Ekins ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:cto:journl:v:2:y:1982:i:2:p:637-652