War, Capital, and the Birth of the State: A Mean Field Theory of Endogenous Political Dominance

Heng-Fu Zou ()

No 754, CEMA Working Papers from China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics

Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic stochastic model of state formation from an anarchic condition, integrating insights from Hobbes, Nozick, and Tilly within a mean field game framework. A continuum of agents, each equipped with capital and arms, optimize consumption, investment, and military spending while facing externalities from the militarization of others. Recursive military advantage allows some agents to defeat ri- vals, seize resources, and transition into dominant protective agencies— emergent states. We formalize war as a capital transfer mechanism and taxation as a means of fiscal consolidation. The model produces endoge- nous divergence in coercive and productive capacity, demonstrating how military asymmetries, recursive violence, and fiscal extraction lead to the birth and persistence of centralized authority.

Keywords: State formation; mean field games; military asymmetry; capital accumulation; war and taxation; dynamic political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2025-05-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cuf:wpaper:754

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