Power Accumulation and Endogenous Inequality: A Mean Field Game Approach to Elite Dominance

Heng-Fu Zou ()

No 759, CEMA Working Papers from China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics

Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic model of power accumulation and inequality using the framework of mean field games. Agents optimize intertemporally over consumption while accumulating power as a capital stock, subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Power yields direct utility and enhances future accumulation. In equilibrium, the joint distribution of power and productivity evolves endogenously via a coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Fokker-Planck system. We prove that - even absent initial heterogeneity-persistent inequality and elite dominance emerge as stable outcomes. The stationary distribution exhibits fat tails and high Gini coefficients, consistent with empirical observations of power concentration in historical empires and modern regimes. The model offers a structural explanation for the recurrent emergence of dominant elites under decentralized, rational decision-making.

Keywords: power accumulation; inequality; mean field games; elite dominance; stochastic dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2025-05-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cuf:wpaper:759

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