The Rise of a Superpower: Endogenous Asymmetry in a Symmetric Mean Field Game of Militarization and Capital Accumulation

Heng-Fu Zou ()

No 762, CEMA Working Papers from China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics

Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic mean field game model in which a superpower emerges endogenously from stochastic regime shifts in capital productivity and military effectiveness. Starting from a symmetric population, countries accumulate capital and arms under strategic external ities. Rare transitions into high-productivity regimes generate sustained divergence, concentrating power in a single dominant actor. We derive the coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Fokker-Planck equations, simulate closed-form solutions, and illustrate how asymmetry arises without exogenous advantage. The framework provides a tractable foundation for analyzing unipolarity, arms races, and welfare divergence in decentralized strategic environments.

Keywords: Mean Field Games; Superpower Emergence; Militarization; Capital Accumulation; Strategic Externalities; Regime Switching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2025-05-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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