Power and Accountability on the Pennsylvania Railroad, 1846–1878*

James A. Ward

Business History Review, 1975, vol. 49, issue 1, 37-59

Abstract: Despite attempts by the state legislature to fashion the charter of the Pennsylvania Railroad in such a way as to insure a high degree of managerial accountability to the board of directors and to make the corporation broadly accountable to the public, things turned out very differently. The volume and complexity of managerial decisions quickly brought a centralization of power in the hands of the road's professional managers as the board atrophied, and the economic and political power of the road and its dominant figures (J. Edgar Thomson and Thomas A. Scott) negated much of the principle of public accountability.

Date: 1975
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