Pre-welfare state provision and adverse selection: enrolment in a Swedish nationwide health insurance society

Lars Fredrik Andersson, Liselotte Eriksson and Josef Lilljegren

Financial History Review, 2023, vol. 30, issue 1, 74-99

Abstract: Mutual benefit societies evolved as the major provider for sickness, accident and life insurance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on both sides of the Atlantic. One of the major problems facing insurers was the risk of adverse selection, i.e. that unhealthy individuals had more incentives than healthy individuals to insure when priced for the average risk. By empirically examining whether longevity among insured individuals in a nationwide mutual health society was different from a matched sample of uninsured individuals, we seek to identify the presence of adverse selection. We find no compelling evidence showing that unhealthy individuals were more likely to insure, or reasons to believe that problems related to adverse selection would have been a major reason for government intervention in the health insurance market in Sweden.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:fihrev:v:30:y:2023:i:1:p:74-99_4

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