Directors: Older and Wiser, or Too Old to Govern?

Ronald Masulis, Cong Wang, Fei Xie and Shuran Zhang

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2025, vol. 60, issue 1, 169-208

Abstract: An unintended consequence of recent governance reforms in the United States is firms’ greater reliance on older director candidates, resulting in noticeable board aging. We investigate this phenomenon’s implications for corporate governance. We document that older independent directors exhibit poorer board meeting attendance, are less likely to serve on or chair key board committees, and receive less shareholder support in annual elections. These directors are associated with weaker board oversight in acquisitions, CEO turnovers, executive compensation, and financial reporting. However, they can also provide particularly valuable advice when they have specialized experience or when firms have greater advisory needs.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:60:y:2025:i:1:p:169-208_6

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