PAYG challenge for preferential migration

Gurgen Aslanyan and Oleg Mariev

Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 2021, vol. 20, issue 2, 301-316

Abstract: The current study assesses the role of the pay-as-you-go system as an intergenerational redistributive mechanism while immigration control is considered. A theoretical model of a small open economy populated with overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents is used to show that skill-favouring immigration policies are, under rather permissive conditions, welfare depriving for the overall population. However, the policy-setting generation is shown to benefit from immigration control, thus decreasing the welfare for the future population.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jpenef:v:20:y:2021:i:2:p:301-316_7

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