EL FRUTO DE LA INSEGURIDAD. VINO, CONTRATO ÓPTIMO Y DERECHOS DE PROPIEDAD EN CATALUÑA (1898–1935)*

Samuel Garrido

Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 2017, vol. 35, issue 3, 415-443

Abstract: Most of the Catalan vineyards were cultivated by means of sharecropping contracts that granted the sharecropper ownership rights over the land. This paper maintains that the “bundle of rights” view of property is not the most appropriate for analysing situations of this kind. It shows that, from around 1900 onwards, sharecroppers’ rights became insecure, which gave rise to a series of dysfunctions that resulted in the contract no longer being optimal. It concludes that the removal of the inefficiencies arising from shared ownership was a sufficient reason to justify the agrarian reform that the Catalan Parliament sought to introduce in 1934.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:reveco:v:35:y:2017:i:03:p:415-443_00

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