Uncertain participation

Péter Bayer and Mánuel László Mágó

Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) from Corvinus University of Budapest

Abstract: We introduce participation uncertainty to the theory of cooperative TUgames. Under participation uncertainty, each coalition’s effective value is an expected value taken over the (full) value of its subsets. We identify ‘constant-marginal’ participation as a key property for various economic problems to be well-behaved. This class of uncertainty environments is closed for mixing and composition. Under this property, solution concepts are easily calculate, two-sided markets clear and are insurable, and voting power under uncertain participation can be characterized and efficiently computed.

Keywords: cooperative games; participation uncertainty; matching markets; voting power; overselling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D51 D72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-08-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2026/02

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