Interdependent Preference Formation

Efe Ok, Rajiv Sethi () and Levent Kockesen

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: A standard assumption in the economic approach to individual decision making is that people have independent preferences. We study equilibria of the classic common pool resource extraction and public good games when some of the players have negatively interdependent preferences while the remainder are payoff maximizers in the usual sense.

Keywords: ECONOMETRICS; SOCIALIZATION; EXTERNALITIES; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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