Self-Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime

Sarah Stafford ()
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Sarah Stafford: Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

No 26, Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

Abstract: This paper adds to the debate over whether self-policing can increase environmental protection by considering an aspect of self-policing that has been ignored in previous models Ð that self-policing may influence future enforcement. The model combines self-policing with targeted enforcement and allows for both deliberate and inadvertent violations. As expected, rewarding self-policers with more lenient future enforcement increases auditing, remediation, and disclosure of inadvertent violations. Self-policing can also serve as a complement to deliberate compliance and can thus further increase environmental performance. However, under reasonable conditions self-policing can be a substitute for deliberate compliance and could therefore be detrimental to environmental protection.

Keywords: Self-Policing; Environmental Audit; Enforcement; Targeting; Compliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q52 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2006-02-22
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwm:wpaper:26

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