Organ Transplants, Hiring Committees, and Early Rounds of the Kappell Piano Competition

Donald Campbell () and Jerry Kelly ()
Additional contact information
Donald Campbell: Department of Economics, College of William and Mary
Jerry Kelly: Department of Economics, Syracuse University

No 51, Working Papers from Economics Department, William & Mary

Abstract: Function g selects exactly k alternatives as a function of the preferences of n individuals. It cannot be manipulated by any individual, assuming that an individual prefers set A to B whenever A can be obtained from B by eliminating some alternatives and replacing each with a preferred alternative. Then there is someone whose k top-ranked alternatives are always selected if: (i). k = 2 and n $ 2; or (ii). k = 3 and n = 2; or (iii). k > 3, n = 2, and g has a unanimity property; or (iv). k > 2, n $ 2, g has a unanimity property, and no coalition can manipulate.

Keywords: coalitions; dictatorship; manipulation; multi-valued social choice function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2007-04-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
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