L'équilibre des parties dans le contrat de franchise

Antonio El Zeenni

in Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine from Paris Dauphine University

Abstract: Franchising is a contract that is not always balanced. This is due to a relationship where one can find a party, usually the franchisor, dominating the contractual bond. The economic and legal relationships call for much more attention due to the massive investments involved. One will often notice the franchisee being subject to many economic, technical and legal constraints that are practically exaggerated if not unjustified. This is certainly not without any solution. This study attempts to find remedies to the problems raised by this game of domination through examining the contract as well as its various components. The followed method consists of, primarily, the examination of the concept behind each element in this precise contractual framework, to then go back to the definition of franchising, as well as its object; all in light of the concept of equilibrium in order to restore some equality of principle in accordance with the requirements of contractual justice.Definitions, criteria, solutions, and amendments are proposed to serve this purpose.

Keywords: Equilibre; Franchisage; Équivalence; Proportionnalité; Commutativité; Efficience économique; Rentabilité; Investissements; Redevances; Savoir-faire; Valeur; Pouvoir; Collaboration; Intérêt commun; Savoirs associés; Equilibrium; Franchising; Equivalence; Equality; Proportionality; Commutativity; Economic efficiency; Profitability; Royalties; Know-how; Value; Power; Collaboration; Common interest; Joint knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013 Written 2013
Note: dissertation
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