Légitimité de l’audit conjoint: Une analyse structurationniste et néo-institutionnaliste des cas français et danois

Nadia Mhirsi

in Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine from Paris Dauphine University

Abstract: This research contributes to an understanding of joint audit's legitimacy. It aims to highlight the institutional pressures affecting the sustainability of the model and opens a black box which is the interaction between joint auditors. It also shows the impact of these pressures on the relationships within the model and vice versa. We have adopted a theoretical framework using the concepts ofstructuration theory and new institutionalism. Our approach is comprehensive and based on a multiple-Case study with the co-Commissariat aux comptes in France and the to-Revisor systemet in Denmark. We used interviews and historical data as means of data collection. The roles of legislators and regulators seem to trigger different evolutions of the joint audit for both cases. Despite these points of divergence, we were able to establish a common matter relating to the importance of cultural standards for the persistence of joint auditing and its adoption in other contexts. The ideology of fair contract has greatly influenced the perception of the model by the Danish and French auditors. This vision promoting efficient modes of governance has led to the decline of the logic of honor in France and that of Grundtvigianism in Denmark.

Keywords: Co-Commissariat aux comptes; To-Revisor systemet; Légitimité; Théorie de la structuration; Théorie néo-Institutionnelle; Idéologies; Co-Commissariat aux comptes; To-Revisor systemet; Legitimacy; Structuration theory; New institutionalism; Ideologies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M41 M42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014 Written 2014
Note: dissertation
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