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Comment les banques octroient les crédits aux PME ?

Aymen Smondel

in Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine from Paris Dauphine University

Abstract: The recommendations of Basel II impose to banks the use of the "hard" information in the decision making process of SMEs loans. These banks must choose between replacing the "soft" information, already used, by the "hard" information and combining the two forms of information. This thesis explores the various elements that can influence this choice and tries to get the effect of this choice on the bank performance. Since, the cost of information is a fundamental element to adopt this choice; we tried to represent a measure to this cost of information. This cost is based on the time required for the collection and processing of the information. It turns out that the use of "hard" information decreases the flexibility of banks to grant loans to SMEs, for this purpose we tried to examine the different elements that influence the decision-making. We tried to integrate the nature of information among the elements studied. The results show a positive relationship between credit availability and the use of "soft" information. Information asymmetry is a major handicap for banks to distinguish between different types of borrower so the decision of rationing can penalize the good borrowers. Banks, which fear the loss of their customers, are looking to find a solution to this situation: they adopt new activities in search to make profits from riskier loans. The latest study of our thesis tries to show the effect of such services on the volume of loans granted and the net interest margin. Keywords: "soft" information, "hard" information, bank-SME relationship, information asymmetries, credit rationing, new services, non-interest income.

Keywords: "soft" information; "hard" information; bank-SME relationship; information asymmetries; credit rationing; new services; non-interest income; information « soft »; information « hard »; relation banque-PME; asymétrie d'information; rationnement des crédits; nouveaux services; revenus non liés à l‟intérêt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G32 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011 Written 2011
Note: dissertation
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