My (Running) Mate, the Mayor: Political Ties and Access to Public Jobs in Ecuador

Pablo Brassiolo, Ricardo Estrada and Gustavo Fajardo

No 1521, Research Department working papers from CAF Development Bank Of Latinamerica

Abstract: We show that local politicians’ probability of being employed by a municipality increases when they have a strong party connection to its mayor. Using a regression discontinuity design, we compare the employment outcomes of individuals connected to the winner vis-à-vis those connected to the runner-up in close mayoral races in Ecuador. Among candidates to local councils who lose their bid, the probability of getting a job in the municipality increases tenfold when their own party’s mayoral nominee is elected. Importantly, the effect is concentrated among low-ranking positions, which reveals that this is the result of political patronage.

Keywords: Democracia; Gobernabilidad; Políticas públicas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dbl:dblwop:1521

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