Separating Selection and Incentive Effects: an Econometric Study of Swiss Health Insurance Claims Data

Lucien Gardiol, Pierre Geoffard and Chantal Grandchamp

DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: This paper presents an empirical analysis of the link between health insurance coverage and health care expenditures. We use claims data for over 60 000 adult individuals covered by a major Swiss Health Insurance Fund, followed for up to four years. In the Swiss health insurance system, each individual can choose between five plans, corresponding to different levels of annual deductible. The data show a strong positive correlation between coverage and expenditure. We provide a simple method to separate selection effects (due to individual choice of coverage) and incentive effects (" moral hazard "). The method only requires that there exists an observable variable: 1. correlated with the unobservable health status; 2. not affected by incentives. The analysis of mortality rates indicates important selection effects, which is confirmed by the data on inpatient care. However, the positive correlation between coverage and outpatient expenditure is not fully explained by selection effects, and moral hazard effects are of the same order of magnitude.

Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.delta.ens.fr/abstracts/wp200327.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www.delta.ens.fr:80 (No such host is known. )

Related works:
Working Paper: Separating Selection and Incentive Effects: an Econometric Study of Swiss Health Insurance Claims Data (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:del:abcdef:2003-27

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in DELTA Working Papers from DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().