Quantifying Bargaining Power in Supply Chains: Essential for Merger Control

Yann Delaprez and Morgane Guignard

DIW Weekly Report, 2024, vol. 14, issue 22/23, 159-164

Abstract: Merger control plays a central role in competition policy. When assessing proposed mergers, Competition Authorities should consider its impact on all relevant markets. Large mergers between manufacturers typically impact competition, thus requiring the approval of Competition Authorities. Divestitures are often a condition of merger approval. This report investigates the effectiveness of implementing such merger remedies when bargaining between manufacturers and retailers is a key market feature. We examine the upstream merger between DEMB and Mondeléz that was approved by the European Commission in May 2015, subject to a divestiture. The divestiture indeed helped to mitigate the negative impacts of the merger. From the consumer’s point of view, divestitures should take place in favor of manufacturers with less bargaining power.

Keywords: Bargaining Power; Merger; Competition Authority; Consumer Surplus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D12 L11 L40 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.903587.de/dwr-24-22-1.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwdwr:dwr14-22-1

Access Statistics for this article

DIW Weekly Report is currently edited by Tomaso Duso, Marcel Fratzscher, Peter Haan, Claudia Kemfert, Alexander Kritikos, Alexander Kriwoluzky, Stefan Liebig, Lukas Menkhoff, Karsten Neuhoff, Carsten Schröder, Katharina Wrohlich and Sabine Fiedler

More articles in DIW Weekly Report from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bibliothek ().