The value of information in an agency model with moral hazard

Randy Silvers

Working Papers from Deakin University, Department of Economics

Keywords: Moral Hazard; Principal-Agent; Informed Principal; Information; Technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2006_22

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