Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets

Yuji Fujinaka and Takuma Wakayama

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is securely implementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (ii) a neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (iii) an efficient solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case.

Date: 2008-12, Revised 2009-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0727r

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