Experimental Evaluation of Random Incentive System under Ambiguity

Tomohito Aoyama and Nobuyuki Hanaki

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: The random incentive system (RIS) is a standard incentive scheme used to elicit preferences in economic experiments. However, it has been speculated that RIS may distort observed preferences. We examine the performance of RIS under ambiguity with two sets of experiments, our own and another replicating the main treatments of Baillon et al. (2022a). Contrary to Baillon et al. (2022a), who report a significantly lower proportion of participants revealing strict ambiguity aversion in the treatment with RIS than the one without, we do not find such evidence either in our own or in replication of Baillon et al. (2022a).

Date: 2024-03, Revised 2025-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-upt
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1236R.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1236r

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Librarian ().