Better the Devil You Know: Managers’ Networks and Their Influence on Hiring, Responsibilities, and Performance

Clochard Gwen-Jirō, Carlos Gomez-Gonzalez and Marco Henriques Pereira

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: This paper investigates how managers leverage their professional networks (former employees) to influence three key dimensions: hiring, responsibilities, and performance. We use rich transactional data in professional football (soccer) in Europe: over 6k coaches, 80k players, and 100k movements. First, we find that managers rely heavily on their networks for hiring, particularly for non-star workers, and at a somewhat lower cost. Second, managers give network-hired workers more responsibilities, particularly in the first year. Third, network-recruited workers are significantly positively associated with performance. We conduct additional heterogeneity analyses and robustness tests, and discuss generalizability and implications for managers in other industries.

Date: 2025-02, Revised 2026-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-spo
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1275r

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