Cross-Channel Strategy in Platform Competition

Seiya Hirano and Yuta Kittaka

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: Cooperation between competing platforms is commonly observed. While the impact of such coopetition on platform competition has been studied, the contractual terms governing such cooperation are typically taken as given, leaving the formation of such cooperation largely unexplored. This paper analyzes a cross-channel strategy in which consumers can access one platform’s content through its rival’s superior distribution channel, and examines whether the strategy emerges through bargaining over the associated revenue-sharing rate. We show that the cross-channel plan is introduced only when the content-providing platform receives about half or more of the revenue generated by the plan. We further show that the welfare effects depend on how the contractual terms are determined. Under a revenue-sharing arrangement determined through Nash bargaining, introducing the cross-channel plan increases industry profit, consumer surplus, and total surplus. By contrast, under an arrangement that combines revenue sharing with a lump-sum transfer, industry profit increases, but consumer surplus and total surplus may decrease.

Date: 2026-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1324

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