Law enforcement with unlawful investigations and enforcer's liability

Eric Langlais and Ken Yahagi

No 2025-21, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: This paper presents a theoretical framework for analyzing agency problems in the law enforcement process and governance of law enforcement organizations. Self-interested law enforcement agents, motivated by the desire to lower crime rates, may engage in inappropriate investigations to secure more convictions, often harming individuals in the process (e.g., through aggressive policing or unlawful practices). Meanwhile, a government driven by rent-seeking motives such as maximizing fine revenues may fail to implement effective liability rules to properly discipline these agents. As a result, law enforcement policies may become distorted, leading to enforcement levels that are excessive when dealing with minor harms and insufficient when addressing more serious offenses.

Keywords: police officers' liability; misconduct; rent-seeking government. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Law enforcement with unlawful investigations and enforcer's liability (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2025-21

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