Stochastic games with a single controller and incomplete information

Nicolas Vieille (), Dinah Rosenberg and Eilon Solan ()

No 754, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: We study stochastic games with incomplete information on one side, where the transition is controlled by one of the players.

We prove that if the informed player also controls the transition, the game has a value, whereas if the uninformed player controls the transition, the max-min value, as well as the min-max value, exist, but they may differ.

We discuss extensions to the case of incomplete information on both sides.

Keywords: stochastic games; zero-sum games; incomplete information; value; maxmin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2002-05-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information (2004)
Working Paper: Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information (2002)
Working Paper: Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:0754

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