Governance changes in strategic alliances: Antecedents of contractual renegotiations

Jeffrey J. Reuer and Africa Ariño ()
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Jeffrey J. Reuer: INSEAD
Africa Ariño: IESE Business School, Postal: IESE Business School. Research Division, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN

No D/415, IESE Research Papers from IESE Business School

Abstract: This study provides an empirical investigation of the incidence and antecedents of contractual renegotiations in strategic alliances. We bring together initial conditions based on transaction cost theory and ex post contingencies highlighted by recent conceptual and qualitative research on the evolution of collaborative agreements. The results indicate that firms tend to change the governance of alliances when a misalignment exists between the chosen structure and features of the transaction. Further, we find that asset specificity affects alliance design as well as post-formation governance decisions. Contractual alterations are more likely in the presence of strategic change and when firms employ less extensive ex post deterrents in their alliances. We find no evidence that cross-border ventures are any more or less likely to experience contractual renegotiations than domestic alliances.

Keywords: Strategic alliances; renegotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M10 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2000-04-13
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0415

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