Entrepreneurial alliances as contractual forms

Jeffrey J. Reuer, Africa Ariño () and Thomas Mellewight
Additional contact information
Jeffrey J. Reuer: Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University
Africa Ariño: IESE Business School, Postal: Research Division, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN
Thomas Mellewight: University of Leipzig

No D/527, IESE Research Papers from IESE Business School

Abstract: Building upon taxonomical research on interfirm alliances, we investigate the design of entrepreneurial firms' alliances in more fine-grained terms by focusing on the specific contractual provisions that firms put into their alliance contracts. Drawing upon transaction cost arguments, we examine the determinants of the contractual complexity of collaborative agreements in the German telecommunications industry. Further, in order to separate contractual form and governance structure and to compare their antecedents, we also examine factors influencing the choices firms make between equity and non-equity arrangements.

Keywords: entrepreneurial alliances; alliance contracts; contract negotiations; telecommunications industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2003-11-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/DI-0527-E.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0527

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IESE Research Papers from IESE Business School IESE Business School, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Noelia Romero ().