The Institutional Architecture of Regulation and Competition: Spains's 2012 Reform

Francesc Trillas
Additional contact information
Francesc Trillas: IESE Business School, Postal: IESE Business School. Research Division, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN

No D/1067, IESE Research Papers from IESE Business School

Abstract: The decision to allocate a given number of governmental interventions in one or more agencies, for example, in the field of regulation and antitrust, raises important issues in organizational and institutional economics. The economics literature suggests that this decision should take into account horizontal and vertical incentive issues and should also take into account the risk of capture and the degree of optimal regulatory independence. More specifically, it should also consider the subtle complementarity and substitutability between competition policy and ex-ante regulation, and its relationship with the vertical chain of government. These issues are illustrated with the decision of the Spanish government to send a legislative proposal to Congress in early 2012 to merge the main network industry regulators with the competition policy authority. The combination of the economic literature's insights with the specific characteristics of regulated sectors in Spain suggests the need for regulatory reform, but does not seem consistent neither with full integration nor with a homogeneous level of (lower than in the status quo) regulatory independence.

Keywords: Institutional architecture; regulatory reform; competition; Spain. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2013-04-24
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/WP-1067-E.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-1067

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IESE Research Papers from IESE Business School IESE Business School, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Noelia Romero ().