Information acquisition and decision making in committees: a survey

Kerstin Gerling, Hans Peter Grüner, Alexandra Kiel and Elisabeth Schulte

No 256, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: This is a survey on the recent game theoretic literature on committee decision making. We consider theoretical work on the role of (i) strategic voting, (ii) costly information acquisition, (iii) conflicting interests, and (iv) communication in committees. Moreover, we review recent experimental evidence on these issues. Our analysis focuses on the optimal size, composition, and decision rules of committees. We discuss implications for the design of monetary policy committees. JEL Classification: D71, E52

Keywords: Committees; costly information acquisition; monetary policy committees; strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Journal Article: Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:2003256

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