Out with the new, in with the old? Supranational bank supervision and the composition of firm investment

Miguel Ampudia, Thorsten Beck and Alexander Popov

No 3286, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: Using exogenous variation generated by the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the euro area, we find that relative to firms borrowing from banks subject to national supervision, firms borrowing from banks subject to supranational supervision reduce their share of intangible assets. This effect does not pre-date the supervisory reform and it does not obtain in non-SSM jurisdictions. The reallocation of investment away from intangible assets is stronger for small and young firms and appears to be driven by a short-term reduction in lending and a persistent increase in collateral standards. JEL Classification: D25, F30, G21, G28

Keywords: intangibles; international banking; investment; lending; supervision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-eec
Note: 2445760
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20263286

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