Revocable Commitment and Sequential Bargaining

Abhinay Muthoo

Economic Journal, 1992, vol. 102, issue 411, 378-87

Abstract: In this paper, the author presents a noncompetitive bargaining model which unifies the two well-known but distinct bargaining games due to J. Nash (1953) and A. Rubinstein (1982). Moreover, the author explores the robustness of the equilibrium set of these two bargaining games to a particular kind of perturbation in the commitment structure of the underlying extensive forms. From a different perspective and interpretation of the model, the author examines and studies the relationship between the equilibrium commitment levels and the costs to the bargainers of revoking their respective commitments. Copyright 1992 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1992
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