Gaining and Losing ERM Credibility: The Case of the United Kingdom

Paul Masson

Economic Journal, 1995, vol. 105, issue 430, 571-82

Abstract: The model of this paper highlights two aspects of credibility: signaling the type of government, which is assumed not to be known; and, for any type, the likelihood that if circumstances are sufficiently unfavorable a devaluation will be impossible to avoid, since not to do so would go against the government's interests. These two factors have opposite implications for the link between unemployment and interest differentials: high unemployment signals a tough government but also makes it less likely that even a tough government will maintain an existing parity. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1995
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