EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice

Ananish Chaudhuri (), Andrew Schotter and Barry Sopher

Economic Journal, 2009, vol. 119, issue 534, 91-122

Abstract: We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the 'Minimum Effort Game' which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter-generational design might enable subjects to converge to the payoff-dominant outcome. We find that coordination is most likely to result when the advice is made public and also distributed in a manner that makes it common knowledge. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (111)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter‐Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice (2009) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:534:p:91-122

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0013-0133

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen

More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:534:p:91-122