Tariff Reform: Some Pre-strategic Considerations

Murray Kemp and Henry Wan

Working Papers from Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics

Abstract: We consider the implications of improving on GATT/WTO tariff negotiations both the most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause and the twin Paretian rules (that negotiations leave the trading world on its efficiency locus and each participating country in a preferred position). It is shown that the set of tariff reforms that satisfy both rules (a) is always non-empty, (b) might include no reforms that end in world-wide free trade, (c) always includes reforms that are incompatible with free trade and (d) might include reforms that support a Pareto-optimal and Pareto-improving allocation but also support other allocations with neither of those characteristics.

JEL-codes: F10 F11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:corcae:03-01

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