Social Norms and Choice: A Weak Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games

Kevin Hasker
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Kevin Hasker: Rice U

Working Papers from Rice University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A folk theorem for repeated matching games is established that holds if the stage game is not a pure coordination game. It holds independent of population size and for all matching rules-including rules that depend on players choices or the history of play. This paper also establishes an equilibrium condition and using this discovers two differences between the equilibria of repeated matching games and standard repeated games. Trigger strategies are not equilibria and there is no simple optimal penal code.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:riceco:2000-10

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