Theories of Delegation in Political Science

Jonathan Bendor, Amihai Glazer and Thomas H. Hammond
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Thomas H. Hammond: Michigan State U

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: We survey modern models of delegation which assume that a boss and subordinate pursue their own goals. Among the major themes covered are the following: the conditions under which the boss will prefer to delegate versus those in which she will prefer to retain authority; the ways in which a boss can induce a subordinate to truthfully reveal information; when rational principals will use the ally principle (i.e., delegate to agents with similar goals); delegation in repeated interactions; and the ways in which delegation can overcome commitment problems. These ideas are applied to a wide variety of institutions, including intra-legislative organization, executive-legislative relations, and central banks.

Date: 2000-09
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Working Paper: Theories of Delegation in Political Science (2000)
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